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Abstract 
Using the methodology introduced by Campbell et al. (2001), we decompose and evaluate the 
historical volatility patterns of the Swedish stock market in the time period 1985 - 2012. The 
volatility at all component levels, including idiosyncratic risk, appear to be fairly stable 
throughout the sample, with the exception of temporary dramatic increases during periods of 
economic distress. As opposed to Campbell et al. (2001), we do not find an upward trend in 
idiosyncratic volatility in the full sample period. Increased competition or an increased number 
of listed firms does not appear to cause an increase in idiosyncratic risk in Sweden. A similar 
approach is used to study the volatility of individual industries. The results are mixed. Six out 
of 19 industries exhibit a significant trend in the full sample period, of which four have  
negative trend coefficients.  
 
 
Keywords: Idiosyncratic volatility, volatility decomposition, stock market volatility, predictive 
power, industry volatility 
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1. Introduction 
At present date, many countries, institutions, banks and other companies are still struggling in 
the aftermath of the subprime crisis that emerged in the autumn of 2008. The general notion 
seems to proclaim that the riskiness and volatility of the stock market is as high as ever, and 
some research points out that, in particular, the idiosyncratic volatility follows a positive linear 
trend (e.g. Campbell et al. (2001)). This would have significant consequences for investors and 
the market as a whole. However, the overall results from research made on the matter are 
ambiguous. Nevertheless, with the recent and historically severe crisis fresh in mind, along 
with its long-term consequences, the subject of stock market volatility and the mechanisms 
behind the fluctuations remains highly topical.  
 
In fact, the volatility of equity markets is one of the most fundamental and important elements 
of financial economics. Ever since Markowitz’ Modern Portfolio Theory (1952) and the 
development of CAPM by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), numerous studies have been 
made on the subject of aggregated volatility, mainly on the U.S. stock market. However, during 
the last decade we have seen a rather dramatic increase in the literature covering the 
idiosyncratic volatility. One of the first papers that focused on a decomposed volatility 
approach, written by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001)
1
, found evidence for an upward 
trend in the firm-specific (or idiosyncratic-) volatility on the American stock market in the time 
period between 1962 and 1997. Authors of follow-up papers and other related literature have 
made various attempts to explain the phenomena, its causes and consequences in greater detail, 
which indeed has increased the interest for idiosyncratic risk
2
. Some of the conclusions and 
ideas from previous authors will be presented and discussed below. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the historical movement of the average volatility of the 
stocks traded on the Swedish market using the same approach and decomposition method as 
Campbell et al. (2001). Thus, we are paying extra attention to the measure of idiosyncratic risk. 
We decompose the total stock market volatility into a market-specific (MKT), industry-specific 
                                                 
1
 Henceforth Campbell et al. (2001) 
2
 In this text, volatility refers to the standard deviation (or variance) of the return. This is directly connected with 
the concept of financial risk. Thus, volatility and risk will be used interchangeably. 
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(IND) and firm-specific (FIRM) component, where FIRM represents the average idiosyncratic 
volatility. Observations are obtained on quarterly basis using monthly gross stock returns. 
Moreover, the three measures are averages over industries, which enables us to disregard 
estimations of firm-, and industry-specific beta values. This is one of the most appealing 
benefits with the method, since a proper estimation of time varying betas is a difficult task, and 
may end up in results that are hard to interpret.  
 
Since we follow the empirical methodology applied by Campbell et al. (2001), our main focus 
is to evaluate the volatility patterns of the three measures over time, again, with particular 
interest in the FIRM component. In short, we will test whether the FIRM component, as well as 
the other volatility measures, follows a linear trend throughout the sample by performing a 
simple trend test. Moreover, we will investigate the lead relationship between the measures, as 
well as forecasting power on GDP growth and stock market returns using regression analysis in 
order to see if the components can help us predict general economic and financial movements. 
In a similar but not as detailed manner, we will present an overview of the volatility of 
individual industries in an effort to better understand the volatility behaviour.  
 
Our contribution to the economic literature mainly constitutes of the fact that the thesis 
provides an updated and robust statistical description and evaluation of the volatility patterns of 
the Swedish stock market. The sample covers three time periods of economic distress (i.e. the 
banking crisis in the 1990’s, the dotcom bubble in the early 2000’s and the more recent 
subprime crisis in 2008/2009), making the study current and up to date, providing further 
evidence of the behaviour of stock market volatility in times of economic and financial crises. 
The same holds for our study of individual industries, which also, in practise, may have a great 
value to investors that are particularly interested in-, or restricted to, the Swedish market. This 
has, as far as we know, not been done with Swedish data before.   
 
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we briefly present a theoretical background for 
the study and provide a summary of the most important research on the topic. Section 3 
describes the data. In Section 4, we explain the empirical method. The results are presented in 
Section 5. Section 6 provides an analysis and discussion about the results, and in Section 7 we 
come with conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we will briefly introduce the theoretical fundaments upon which we base our 
analysis, discussions and conclusions. We will also discuss the importance and relevance of 
idiosyncratic volatility.  
 
2.1 Portfolio Theory and CAPM 
The very foundation of modern portfolio theory can to a very high extent be attributable to 
Harry M. Markowitzs’ work in the 1950’s, when he introduced the concept of mean-variance 
efficient portfolios. That is, portfolios that cannot achieve any lower risk through 
diversification without also lowering the expected return (alternatively, portfolios that cannot 
gain any expected return without an increased risk). Markowitz also introduced the Efficient 
Frontier, which is a set of assets that, combined, has the highest possible expected return for a 
given level of risk. William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965) soon developed the work of 
Markowitz into the famous Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which still is widely used to 
price individual assets and portfolios. 
 
The model is built upon assumptions about the market and the investors. For instance, the 
model assumes that investors have homogenous expectations, hold mean-variance efficient 
portfolios and that transaction costs are absent. Moreover, according to this theory, 
idiosyncratic risk is easily eliminated through diversification. Therefore, the exposure of non-
diversifiable (systematic) risk is the only measure of risk that is included in the CAPM. The 
original CAPM equation is (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, Chapter 5, p. 182)):  
 
(1)        [  ]          [  ]      
 
Where  [  ] is the expected return of asset i,    is the risk-free rate,     is the beta value of 
asset i with respect to the market and  [  ] is the expected market return. Although the basic 
CAPM model has been subject to some criticism during the years (see for instance Roll 
(1977)), and numerous variations of the model have been applied to different fields of financial 
economics, the model is still one of the great fundaments of the financial science. 
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2.2 Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Unlike systematic volatility, idiosyncratic (also: firm-specific-, or unsystematic-) volatility is 
the part of the total volatility of a stock or asset that depends exclusively on the asset itself. 
That is, in theory, it has little or no correlation with the volatility of the market as a whole. To 
illustrate, we can rewrite and rearrange the CAPM equation (equation (1)) and include a 
residual term (Bali et al. (2005)): 
 
(2)                               
 
Here,    is the excess return of asset i,    is the excess return of the market and    is the return 
that is specific to asset i, i.e. the idiosyncratic return of asset i. Taking the volatilities, we have: 
 
(3)                    
     
    
     
  
 
Where    
  is the total volatility of asset i,    
    
  is asset i’s systematic risk component and    
  
is the assets idiosyncratic, or asset-specific, volatility. Rearranging again, we see that one can 
express the idiosyncratic volatility as the total volatility of an asset minus its systematic 
volatility: 
 
(4)                   
     
     
    
  
 
However, according to the CAPM, the idiosyncratic risk can be diversified away and that    is 
common for all assets,     is the only asset-specific factor included in the model for 
determining the expected return of asset i. Hence, the model disregards the idiosyncratic 
volatility,    
 .  
 
Nevertheless, even though CAPM does not take idiosyncratic risk into account, the 
assumptions behind the model are rarely realistic. Thus, there are several reasons why 
knowledge of the behaviour and properties of idiosyncratic risk is both important and valuable. 
To begin with, many investors are restricted in one way or another with respect to investment 
possibilities, or may, by some other reason, be incapable to hold a well-diversified portfolio in 
accordance with financial theory. This lack of optimisation makes investors vulnerable to 
changes in volatility on both industry- and firm level (Campbell et al. (2001)). Furthermore, the 
number of stocks needed to achieve a well-diversified portfolio highly depends on the level of 
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idiosyncratic volatility. A common rule-of-thumb suggests that a portfolio of approximately 20 
to 30 stocks should be enough to eliminate almost all of the idiosyncratic fluctuations. 
However, the rule may be invalid in the presence of high levels of idiosyncratic volatility. That 
is, an investor may in reality need twice the number of assets to eliminate the idiosyncratic risk 
(Campbell et al. (2001)).  
 
Another important aspect to take into consideration is the possibility of large pricing errors of 
individual stocks. High levels of idiosyncratic volatility increases the risk faced by arbitrageurs 
who try to exploit mispricing of a particular stock, which could make them less inclined to take 
market action. On a large scale, such a scenario may lower the overall efficiency of the market.  
 
Moreover, idiosyncratic volatility plays a great role in event studies. This is because the 
statistical significance of the abnormal returns of interest (at least considering studies of 
individual stocks) is determined by the volatility of individual assets in relation to the market. 
Also, the level of idiosyncratic volatility affects option pricing, since the price of an option 
written on a stock is determined by the total return volatility of the stock. This, in turn, implies 
that volatility on firm-, industry-, and market level are all a part of the pricing mechanism 
(Campbell et al. (2001)).  
 
2.3. Literature Review 
During the last decade, much attention has been brought to the subject of idiosyncratic 
volatility, its consequences and causes. Below follows a summary of some of the most 
important literature to date. 
 
Xu and Malkiel (2001) use two approaches for constructing idiosyncratic volatility; the indirect 
approach proposed by Campbell et al. (2001), as well as an alternative, direct approach, 
applying the Fama-French three-factor methodology. Their paper confirms the previous 
findings of Campbell et al. (2001) that the volatility of individual stocks has increased over 
time (albeit the volatility of the total market has been stable). Furthermore, they find that 
movements of the NASDAQ exchange seem to contribute to the increase of the idiosyncratic 
volatility, although it only accounts for a fraction of the explanation for the upward trend in 
idiosyncratic volatility. Similarly, Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) find an upward linear trend in 
idiosyncratic volatility, which correspond to previous studies, as well as a positive relationship 
between average stock variance and market returns. They argue that the trade-off between risk 
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and return in the stock market should include not only systematic risk, but idiosyncratic risk as 
well. Moreover, Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003), find that idiosyncratic volatility represents a 
large portion of the total stock risk. Finally, they propose an explanation of their findings based  
on prospect theory. 
 
Goyal and Santa-Clara are, however, criticized by Wei and Zhang (2005) and Bali, Cakici, Yan 
and Zhang (2005). Wei and Zhang suggest that the forecasting power found by Goyal and 
Santa-Clara (2003) is mainly driven by data in the 1990’s. Bali et al. (2005) argues that most of 
the results in Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) are not robust across different stock portfolios or 
for different sample periods. Furthermore, Bali et al. (2005) finds no forecasting power of the 
stock market returns. They argue that the results from Goyal and Santa-Clara are partly driven 
by a liquidity premium. 
 
A more general study is made by Guo and Savickas (2008), who use monthly stock return data 
from the G7 countries to show that idiosyncratic volatility to some extent can predict aggregate 
stock market returns over time, and that idiosyncratic volatility explains the cross-section of 
stock returns just as well as the book-to-market factor. They also show that, because of high 
correlation, idiosyncratic volatility from the U.S. forecasts stock market returns in the other G7 
countries, and vice versa. Finally, Guo and Savickas suggest that average idiosyncratic 
volatility might be a proxy for systematic risk, as well as for risk factors omitted from the 
CAPM. 
 
Wei and Zhang (2006) make an attempt to answer the following questions: 1.) To which extent 
can the upward trend in the average return volatility be attributed to the changes in the 
fundamentals of firms? 2.) How is the increased average return volatility divided between 
existing firms and newly listed firms? Using quarterly accounting data at the firm level, the 
authors find two variables that are useful for explaining the upward trend of the average stock 
volatility, namely: 1.) Average return-on-equity, and 2.) average sample variance of the return-
on-equity in the past three years. They confirm the previous findings that average stock 
volatility has increased on the U.S. market. They also find that the age and size of firms can 
explain much of the cross-sectional differences in return variances, but are not responsible for 
the upward trend over time. Since newly listed stocks tend to be smaller, with lower- and more 
volatile earnings than older stocks, Wei and Zhang (2006) conclude that the main reason for the 
increase in the average return volatility is because of the characteristics exhibited by newly 
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listed stocks. Similar findings are made by Angelidis and Tessaromatis (2008) who suggest that 
the average idiosyncratic volatility of small stocks is the main driving factor that can help 
predict stock returns. They argue further that it is the idiosyncratic volatility of small stocks (as 
opposed to large stocks) that matter for asset pricing. 
 
Gaspar and Massa (2006) chose to investigate the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility 
and market competition. Their results show that firms with a high degree of market power 
exhibit lower idiosyncratic volatility. The reasons for this seems to be that market power works 
as a hedging instrument since it smoothes out the idiosyncratic volatility (i.e. decreases cash 
flow fluctuations), and that information for firms with large market power is more certain than 
for small firms, which decreases return volatility. Gaspar and Massa (2006) finally conclude 
that the increase in idiosyncratic volatility is due to increased market competition (which is an 
effect of deregulation and globalization). Similar findings are made by Irwine and Pontiff 
(2009), who find that the increase in idiosyncratic volatility is attributable to an increase in 
economy-wide competition. Moreover, they argue that the increased idiosyncratic risk is driven 
mainly by individual firm’s earnings, cash flows and sales.  
 
Putting less emphasis on fundamentals, Chua, Goh and Zhang (2006) examine the relation 
between idiosyncratic volatility and the cross-section of stock returns on the U.S. market. They 
use a method with which they decompose the idiosyncratic volatility into two parts; expected- 
and unexpected idiosyncratic volatility. Their main finding is that expected volatility seems to 
be positively related to expected returns.     
 
In contrast to most of the previous authors, Brandt, Brav, Graham and Kumar (2009) argue that 
the upward tendency in idiosyncratic volatility is nothing but an episodic phenomenon, and 
thus not a linear trend. In fact, they show that idiosyncratic volatility has decreased during the 
last few years of the sample. Furthermore, they find that low-priced stocks are more volatile 
than high-priced stocks, which they suggest is because low-price stocks are not widely held by 
large institutions (as opposed to high-priced stocks). Moreover, they argue that an increase in 
retail trading (which dominates the trading with low-priced stocks) can explain the decrease in 
idiosyncratic volatility post 1990’s. Similar results are found by Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang 
(2009), who present several various methods to examine the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility 
of 23 developed equity markets (including Sweden). According to their results, there are no 
signs of an upward linear trend for any country in the sample, which runs from 1980 to 2008. 
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Instead, the authors find that high levels of idiosyncratic volatility are temporary. Bekaert et al. 
(2009) conclude that growth opportunities, total market volatility and variance premium 
explains most of the variation in idiosyncratic volatility. The findings are in line with Zhang 
(2010), who argue that the level of idiosyncratic volatility in the U.S. has declined during the 
last decade. To further explain why the stock return volatility varies over different periods, 
Zhang use various methods to compare two main strands of theories: fundamentals-based 
theories and trading volume-based theories. Zhang (2010) conclude, in line with the findings of 
many other authors, that fundamentals-based theories better explain the volatility patterns. 
 
3. Data 
We use monthly observations of stock returns from all stocks traded on the Swedish stock 
market that are available in Thompson DataStream between January 1985 and December 2012. 
The corresponding market capitalization for each stock and month is also found in DataStream, 
as well as data over OMXS returns and GDP growth. Campbell et al. (2001) use excess returns, 
but for simplicity and convenience, we choose to compute the volatility measures using gross 
stock returns (see for example Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, Chapter 7, p. 268)). This 
should not have any significant effect on the results.  
 
Some of the firms in the sample issue several kinds of stocks (e.g. A-, B-, and C-shares) with 
different voting power or other special properties. We keep only one of these stocks for each 
firm. We prefer B-shares when available since they tend to be most liquid. Furthermore, a 
handful of extreme outliers are removed, together with stocks that we strongly suspect suffer 
from inaccurate data. The final sample consists of 1 079 stocks, in total 101 279 observations. 
We use the industry classification ICBSSN available in DataStream. Firms that do not have an 
industry classification are removed from the sample. Furthermore, the industries Media, Oil & 
Gas, Telecommunications and Utilities do not have data reaching as far back as 1985, but each 
industry is included as soon as sufficient data is available.  
 
3.1. Choice of Weighing Scheme 
Some authors, for instance Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003), Guo and Savickas (2008), perform 
similar studies like this one, but experiment with equal-weighted indices in excess of value-
weighted ones. One reason for using equal-weighted series may be the pure convenience of 
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putting all weights equal. However, we chose to work exclusively with value-weighted returns 
for reasons stated below. 
 
To begin with, we can look at the return correlation between a value-weighted index and the 
OMXS, and compare this to the correlation between the same index with equal weights and the 
OMXS. The correlations are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Return Correlations 
Return Correlations 
VW, OMXS EW, OMXS 
0.9875 0.8164 
  
 
 
 
 
As shown, the value weighted index (VW) has a significantly higher (and almost perfect) 
correlation with the actual returns on the Swedish stock market, than the equal weighted index 
(EW). To make a further illustration of the differences between value- and equal-weighted 
series, we can study Figure 1, where the two MKT components are graphically compared.  
 
Figure 1 – Comparison of MKT Components 
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Comparison, MKT Components 
MKT EV
MKT VW
The left column shows the return correlation between a value-weighted index 
(denoted VW) constructed by all stock in our sample and the OMXS index. The 
right column displays the return correlation between an equal-weighted index 
(denoted EW) consisting of all stocks in our sample and the OMXS index. 
Figure 1 shows a graphical comparison between our value-weighted MKT 
component which we use in our study (here denoted MKT VW) and an equal-
weighted version of the MKT component (denoted MKT EW). 
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Phenomenon like the spike in early 2000 in the equal weighted series could lead to 
misinterpretation and a blunted analysis. We conclude that using value weighted series is 
superior for achieving adequate results.  
 
4. Empirical Method 
We use the decomposition method proposed by Campbell et al. (2001) to examine the volatility 
on the Swedish stock market between 1985 and 2012 at the market-, industry- and firm-level. 
For a more detailed derivation on how the measures are constructed, see Appendix I. One of the 
main goals with this “market-adjusted-return-model” approach is to eliminate the necessity of 
estimating industry- and firm-specific betas, since the estimation is difficult and the results may 
be unstable over time.  
 
Campbell et al. (2001) construct the volatility measures using daily observations. However, 
robustness tests show that the results do not differ when weekly and monthly frequencies are 
applied. We chose to compute the volatility measures with monthly data.  
The three volatility measures are computed as follows: Here, t denotes quarters and s denotes 
months. Market-level volatility is denoted MKT, and is defined as: 
 
(5)          ̂  
  ∑            
  
 
Where    is the mean of the total market return over the full sample period. As in Campbell et 
al. (2001), the market returns are computed using all firms available in each period, and the 
stock returns are based on each stock’s market capitalization.   
 
To compute the industry-specific volatility, we first need to sum the squares of the industry-
specific residual in             (see equation (18) in Appendix I): 
 
(6)                       ̂   
  ∑    
 
    
 
Since we do not want to estimate any covariances or betas, we have to average over industries 
(see Appendix 1). Thus, the average industry-level volatility is: 
 
(7)                       ∑      ̂   
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The procedure is very similar when we compute the volatility at firm-level. Just as in the 
industry-level case, we sum the firm-specific residual in                   (see equation 
(22) in Appendix I): 
 
(8)                      ̂    
  ∑     
 
    
 
We then compute the weighted average of the firm-specific volatilities within an industry: 
 
(9)                 ̂   
  ∑         ̂    
  
 
To complete the computation of average firm-level volatility, we again average over industries 
to ensure that all firm-specific covariances cancel out: 
 
(10)                      ∑      ̂   
  
 
Once we have obtained the volatility components MKT, IND and FIRM, we continue to follow 
the empirical methodology of Campbell et al. (2001). First, we present descriptive statistics and 
perform a graphical analysis of the components to see how the volatility patterns behave over 
time. This is the most basic analysis, but it provides an easily accessible overview of the 
results. Furthermore, we will look at the correlation structure as well as the autocorrelation 
structure, and test if the MKT, IND and FIRM series contain unit roots. This is important if we 
want to feel confident about the validity and reliability of our results. If the series contain unit 
roots, they exhibit infinite variance and the interpretation of the volatility measures, particularly 
from regression analyzes (e.g. spurious regressions), may thus be invalid.  
Moreover, since the most influential finding of Campbell et al. (2001) is the seemingly upward 
sloping linear trend of the idiosyncratic volatility on the U.S stock market, we will test if the 
volatility components (in particular FIRM) exhibit the same pattern on the Swedish market. 
Some of the consequences in the case of such findings are discussed in Section 2.2. We will 
also test the lead relationship between the three components to see if each respective measure 
has any explanatory power on the others. Lastly, again in line with Campbell et al. (2001), we 
will examine the cyclical behavior and explanatory power of the components on GDP growth 
and stock market returns to see if they can help predict the general economic movements.  
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5. Results 
In this main section, we present the results from the computations of our volatility components 
and the volatility of individual industries. Descriptive statistics are found in Section 5.1.1., 
Section 5.1.2. provides a graphical analysis of the series and Section 5.1.3. presents the 
correlation-, and autocorrelation structure of our measures. In Section 5.1.4., we look at the 
results from a trend test, Section 5.1.5 provides the results from a Granger-causality test and in 
Section 5.1.6. we evaluate the predictive power of our volatility components on GDP growth 
and stock market returns. Section 5.2.1. presents the descriptive statistics for individual 
industries, in Section 5.2.2. we perform a graphical analysis of the volatility of individual 
industries, and lastly, in Section 5.2.3., we test for unit roots and trends for individual 
industries. 
 
5.1. Volatility Components 
This subsection provides the results from computations and tests of our volatility components. 
 
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the three volatility components MKT, IND and 
FIRM. Bold numbers indicate the highest value, while numbers in italics indicate the lowest. 
As we can see, FIRM’s values are the highest in every measure, and we conclude that out of the 
three components, FIRM is the most volatile one.  
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics: Volatility Components 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
MKT IND FIRM 
Mean 0.0138 0.0107 0.0276 
Median 0.0069 0.0074 0.0188 
Max 0.1088 0.0719 0.1585 
Min 0.0002 0.0020 0.0064 
Std. Dev. 0.0175 0.0100 0.0258 
Obs. 111 111 111 
 
 
 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of the three volatility components MKT, IND and 
FIRM. Numbers in italics indicate the lowest value, while bold numbers indicate the highest. 
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5.1.2. Graphical Analysis 
A graphic overview of our volatility components (MKT, IND and FIRM) is given in Figure 2. 
The measures are calculated according to the formulas in Section 4. (equations (5) to (10)) and 
is plotted against time. A quick look at the figure suggests that all three measures of volatility 
have been fairly stable throughout the sample. A few peaks emerge during the period, but the 
values seem to always return to their long-term mean. This is at odds with the findings of e.g. 
Campbell et al. (2001), Xu and Malkiel (2001) and Wei and Zhang (2006) among others.  
 
Figure 2 – Plotted MKT, IND and FIRM Component
 
 
 
A more convenient overview of the components’ share of the total volatility is given in Figure 
3. FIRM’s average share is 54%, while the average for MKT and IND is 22% and 24% 
respectively. The proportion of the components with respect to the total volatility is fairly 
stable in the full sample.  
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Figure 2 shows a plot of our three volatility measures MKT, IND and FIRM against time. 
17 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Share of total volatility 
FIRM
MKT
IND
 
 
 
 
Similar to the U.S., we have seen an increase of listed firms in Sweden during the past 30 years. 
For our sample, the number ranges from 135 in 1985 to 461 in the end of 2012. It is interesting 
to note that the graph in Figure 4 displays visible bumps in connection to the three main 
economic crises that we mentioned in the introduction. The number of firms tends to decrease; 
alternatively stagnate, when economic distress occurs. 
 
Figure 4 – Number of Firms In Sample 
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Figure 3 displays the proportions of MKT, IND and FIRM in relation to the total volatility. 
Figure 4 is a plot of the total number of firms that are included in our sample at each point in time.  
Figure 3 – Volatility Components’ Share of Total Volatility 
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5.1.3. Correlation and Autocorrelation Structure 
We begin this subsection by looking at the correlation structure of the three volatility series. 
 
Table 3 – Correlations Between Volatility Measures 
Correlations 
 
MKT IND FIRM 
MKT 1.0000 
  
IND 0.5763 1.0000 
 
FIRM 0.8744 0.6321 1.0000 
 
 
 
In Table 3, we see that MKT and FIRM are highly correlated. MKT and IND exhibit 
approximately the same level of correlation as IND and FIRM. Moreover, in Table 4, we note 
that the series are autocorrelated, and that the autocorrelations are rather persistent. Thus, we 
need to test the presence of unit roots to be confident about the reliability of our results. We 
perform Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on all three series, where the lag length is determined 
with Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The tests are performed both with intercept, as well 
as with intercept and trend. The results are shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 4 – Autocorrelations and Partial Autocorrelations 
Autocorrelations 
MKT IND FIRM 
Lag AC PAC AC PAC AC PAC 
1 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.415*** 0.415*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 
2 0.136*** 0.077*** 0.444*** 0.329*** 0.190*** 0.066*** 
3 0.047** -0.004** 0.228*** -0.043*** 0.109*** 0.023*** 
4 0.122** 0.109** 0.255*** 0.073*** 0.108*** 0.060*** 
5 0.076** 0.023** 0.128*** -0.029*** 0.165*** 0.116*** 
6 -0.029* -0.080* 0.230*** 0.137*** -0.027*** -0.157*** 
12 0.022 0.062 -0.059*** -0.201*** -0.057*** -0.032*** 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 4 presents the autocorrelation (AC), and partial autocorrelation 
(PAC) structure of our three volatility measures. The left column shows the 
number of lags. The numbers in the other columns represent the value of 
the coefficients. Significance level is denoted with one, two or three 
asterisks, representing significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
Table 3 shows the correlations between our 
three volatility measures MKT, IND and FIRM 
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Table 5 – Unit Root Test, Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Unit Root Test - Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
 
MKT IND FIRM 
Specification 
 
t-stat 
 
Intercept -8.0332*** -3.9144*** -7.0704*** 
Intercept and Trend -8.0800*** -3.8945** -7.1105*** 
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all series at the 1% level, with exception 
for IND where both an intercept and a trend coefficient is included, where we reject the null at 
the 5% level. Thus, we can feel confident that the series are stationary and the analysis of the 
volatility measures continues in levels.  
5.1.4. Trends 
Campbell et al. (2001) detect an increasing trend in their sample for the FIRM component 
(while MKT and IND remained stable). Since the linear increase in firm-level (idiosyncratic) 
volatility is one of their main and most important findings, we want to see if our sample 
exhibits the same pattern. We perform a simple trend test with the following specification:  
 
(11)                             
 
Where    is the dependent variable,    is a constant,   is the trend and      is the lagged  
dependent variable. The results from the test are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Trend Tests 
Trend test 
Variable 
MKT IND FIRM 
Coefficient 
α0 0.0132*** 0.0066*** 0.0213*** 
t -0,4841 -0,05451 -0,6331 
Yt-1 0.2445** 0.4172*** 0.3595*** 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows the results from Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests performed on 
each volatility measure. The numbers represent the t-value obtained from the 
regressions. Significance level is denoted with one, two or three asterisks, 
representing significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Table 6 presents the outcomes of the trend tests performed on each volatility measure. Numbers represent the 
value of the regressors’ coefficients. Significance level is denoted with one, two or three asterisks, 
representing significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
1
 The numeric values of the trend coefficients are multiplied by 10
4
. 
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As we can see, the trend coefficient is statistically insignificant for all series, indicating no 
presence of a linear trend. This confirms the initial graphic analysis from Figure 2.  
 
To see if there are periods in our sample in which a statistically significant trend can be found, 
we perform the same trend tests for different time periods. The periods are: 1985:1-1992:4, 
1993:1-2002:4 and 2003:1-2012:4. We find a significant positive trend for MKT and FIRM at 
the 5% level, as well as for IND at the 10% level in the period between 1993:1 and 2002:4. All 
trend coefficients in the other periods are insignificant. In line with Wei and Zhang (2005), we 
suggest that the trend in volatility during this particular period is almost entirely driven by the 
bull market in the 1990’s and the dotcom bubble in the early 2000’s. 
 
5.1.5. Lead Relationship  
In this section, we study the lead relationship between MKT, IND and FIRM by performing a 
Granger causality test. Again, the lag length is based upon the Akaike Information Criterion. 
From a VAR analysis, the AIC suggests that the optimal lag length is 2. The results from the 
Granger causality tests are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 – Granger Causality 
Granger causality 
 
MKT IND FIRM 
MKTt-2 - 0.4884 0.2949 
INDt-2 0.0198** - 0.0041*** 
FIRMt-2 0.0186** 0.0000*** - 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown, MKT does not tend Granger-cause any of the other volatility measures, while IND 
tends to Granger-cause both MKT and FIRM at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We also 
note that FIRM tends to Granger-cause MKT and IND at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
We conclude that both FIRM and IND help predict the variation in the other measures, while 
MKT does not. This result is not entirely in line with Campbell et al. (2001), whose findings 
state that MKT and FIRM have a lead relation with the other measures, while IND does not.  
 
Table 7 displays the results from our Granger Causality tests on our MKT, IND and FIRM 
component. The left column shows each variable at time t-2, while the upper row presents each 
variable at time t. The numbers represent p-values, and significance level is denoted with one, two 
or three asterisks, representing significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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5.1.6. Predictive Power 
We continue to follow Campbell et al. (2001) by investigating the predictive power of the three 
volatility measures on GDP growth. We perform OLS regressions with eight different 
specifications, where GDP growth is regressed on lagged GDP growth, lagged OMXS returns 
and combinations of lagged volatility measures. The results from the regressions can be viewed 
in Table 8. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Quarterly GDP Growth 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant 0.0081 
(0.0049) 
0.0087* 
(0.0050) 
0.0099** 
(0.0045) 
0.0085* 
(0.0049) 
0.0094** 
(0.0045) 
0.0069 
(0.0052) 
0.0108** 
(0.0043) 
0.0049 
(0.0049) 
GDPt-1 
0.7949*** 
(0.0969) 
0.7878*** 
(0.0980) 
0.7822*** 
(0.0937) 
0.7946*** 
(0.0965) 
0.7832*** 
(0.0951) 
0.7850*** 
(0.1012) 
0.7801*** 
(0.0920) 
0.7929*** 
(0.1054) 
OMXSt-1 
0.0004 
(0.0283) 
0.0215 
(0.0365) 
0.0066 
(0.0301) 
0.0007 
(0.0295) 
0.0225 
(0.0379) 
0.0328 
(0.0394) 
0.0079 
(0.0330) 
0.0353 
(0.0380) 
MKTt-1 
-0.7201*** 
(0.1939) 
- -0.5881*** 
(0.1992) 
-0.6414*** 
(0.1685) 
- - -0.4272*** 
(0.1397) 
- 
INDt-1 
0.3902** 
(0.1892) 
0.1418 
(0.2164) 
- 0.4170** 
(0.2007) 
- -0.1583 
(0.1536) 
- - 
FIRMt-1 
0.0645 
(0.0514) 
-0.1987* 
(0.1174) 
0.1122 
(0.0821) 
- -0.1593* 
(0.0837) 
- - - 
Adj. R
2 
0.6721 0.6339 0.6652 0.6757 0.6398 0.6233 0.6665 0.6248 
          
 
 
 
 
 
We see that MKT, when included, is highly statistically significant with a negative coefficient 
in all regressions. This suggests that the market-specific volatility is countercyclical in relation 
to GDP growth, which is in line with the findings of Campbell et al. (2001). It is interesting to 
note that FIRM is insignificant or just weakly significant in all regressions, despite its close 
correlation with MKT (see Table 3). Furthermore, FIRM is only weakly significant when MKT 
is omitted from the regression. The R
2
 values are much higher than those obtained by Campbell 
et al. (2001), whose regressions result in a maximum R
2
-value of 0.222.   
 
Performing the same regressions but with OMXS returns as dependent variable (see Table 10 in 
Appendix II), we do not find much interesting results. No volatility measures are statistically 
Table 8 – Cyclical Properties: GDP Growth 
 
Table 8 shows the results from the regressions with GDP growth as dependent variable. The left column presents the regressors, 
of which all is lagged by one time period except for the constant. The numbers represent the value of the coefficients in each 
regression, and the significance level is denoted with one, two or three asterisks, representing significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. (-) indicate that the variable is omitted from the model. The bottom row displays the adjusted R
2
 value. All 
regressions are performed using Newey-West robust standard errors. 
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significant, except for lagged IND when MKT and FIRM are omitted from the model. This 
particular specification also achieves the highest adjusted R
2
 value (0.1470). However, in 
general, the adjusted R
2
 values are low, and the models seem to be ill fitted. In short, our 
volatility measures do not explain much of the variation of the OMXS returns.   
 
5.2. Individual Industries 
In this subsection, we will take a closer look at the different industries. The intention is to 
perform a similar (but simplified) analysis as for MKT, IND and FIRM. Our main focus is to 
see how the volatility pattern of individual industries behaves during- and in-between economic 
crises. 
 
To compute a measure of volatility for individual industries, we perform the same calculations 
as for the MKT measure, but here we consider the specific industry being the entire market  
Thus, we start by isolating industry i, and compute:.  
 
(12)           
   ̂  
  ∑            
  
 
Where the subscript i denotes the specific industry, t denotes quarter and s denotes month just 
as in previous cases.     
  can be interpreted as the average industry-specific volatility of a 
specific industry. Here, we average over stocks instead of industries, so that the sum of the 
weighted stock betas with respect to its industry equals unity. Again, the measure is based on 
each stock’s market capitalization, but in this case, with respect to the industry instead of the 
total market. 
 
5.2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 9, we present the descriptive statistics for our     
  measures. Media, Oil & Gas, 
Telecommunications and Utilities do not have data available as early as 1985, which explains 
the number of observations. As we can see in the table, Banks exhibit a very high maximum 
value (1.4449), which occurred during the banking crisis in the early 1990’s. The volatility of 
Banks also has the highest standard deviation (0.1420) of all industry-specific measures in the 
sample. Technology has the highest mean (0.0540), as well as the highest beta value (1.50). 
This is not surprising, since the industry historically is characterized of many small firms with 
volatile returns. On the flipside, despite the low number of firms, Utilities is one of the most 
23 
 
stable industries, with the lowest mean (0.0136), median (0.0070), maximum (0.0903) and beta 
value (0.32). It is also one of the industries with the lowest standard deviation (0.0185). 
Industrial Goods & Services is by far the largest industry, in total 285 firms, which likely 
explains the low standard deviation (0.0164). 
 
Table 9 – Descriptive Statistics: Individual Industries 
Industry Mean Median Min Max 
Std. 
Dev. 
Beta Obs. Firms 
Automobiles & Parts 0.0267 0.0126 0.0010 0.1928 0.0345 0.94 111 12 
Banks 0.0406 0.0117 0.0002 1.4449 0.1420 1.05 111 20 
Basic Resources 0.0248 0.0113 0.0002 0.3082 0.0407 0.93 111 50 
Chemicals 0.0265 0.0144 0.0006 0.1816 0.0345 0.61 111 14 
Construction & Materials 0.0193 0.0096 0.0003 0.1984 0.0274 0.92 111 40 
Financial Services 0.0154 0.0078 0.0001 0.1300 0.0188 0.98 111 74 
Food & Beverage 0.0230 0.0080 0.0000 0.3130 0.0465 0.42 111 19 
Health Care 0.0164 0.0086 0.0001 0.1340 0.0221 0.73 111 99 
Industrial Goods & Services 0.0136 0.0079 0.0001 0.0953 0.0164 0.87 111 285 
Insurance 0.0503 0.0253 0.0020 0.5949 0.0830 1.27 111 11 
Media 0.0342 0.0148 0.0000 0.4824 0.0619 0.93 110 28 
Oil & Gas 0.0446 0.0248 0.0030 0.2970 0.0509 0.66 94 25 
Personal & Household Goods 0.0150 0.0088 0.0001 0.1914 0.0222 0.78 111 77 
Real Estate 0.0226 0.0093 0.0001 0.3313 0.0468 0.83 111 71 
Retail 0.0176 0.0106 0.0010 0.1482 0.0201 0.70 111 48 
Technology 0.0540 0.0223 0.0006 1.1375 0.1160 1.50 111 137 
Telecommunications 0.0248 0.0132 0.0004 0.1726 0.0306 0.73 74 15 
Travel & Leisure 0.0271 0.0128 0.0006 0.5928 0.0593 0.81 111 41 
Utilities 0.0136 0.0070 0.0001 0.0903 0.0185 0.32 97 13 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics for all industries. Bold numbers indicate the 
highest value, while number in italics represent the lowest. The standard deviation regards 
the variation of the volatility measure, in a sense, the standard deviation of the variance. 
Beta values are calculated using the following regression:          , where     is the 
industry return,     is the market return and    is the industry beta. Here, s denotes month 
just as in previous cases. Data for Media, Oil & Gas, Telecommunications and Utilities are 
available from 1985:2, 1989:1, 1994:1 and 1988:2, respectively.  
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5.2.2. Graphical Analysis 
In this subsection, we plot some of the most interesting time series of our industry measure. We 
begin with Media.  
Figure 5 – Volatility Plot: Media
 
 
 
What is rather surprising with this graph is that Media actually has the highest volatility peak of 
all industries during the 2008/2009 subprime crisis. One could possibly expect a more volatile 
industry, or an industry in direct connection with the financial markets to react more violently 
to the events in the late 2008. Other than that, we see the expected spikes in the early 1990’s 
and early 2000’s. Finally, there are no signs of a visible trend in the series. 
 
Figure 6 – Volatility Plot: Industrial Goods & Services 
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Industrial Goods & Services 
Figure 5 displays a plot of the volatility for media against time. 
Figure 6 presents a plot of the volatility for industrial goods & services against time. 
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Industrial Goods & Services may, due to its large market cap, serve as a benchmark industry in 
this context. Looking at the graph, we can see spikes in the early 1990’s as well as during the 
subprime crisis. However, the industry seems just marginally affected by the dotcom bubble in 
the early 2000’s. We cannot distinguish any visible signs of a trend in the series. 
 
Figure 7 – Volatility Plot: Banks 
 
 
 
For Banks, we immediately note an extreme spike in the early 1990’s as a consequence of the 
Swedish banking crisis. The increased volatility during the subprime crisis is very modest in 
comparison. Nor here, the graph suggests the presence of a linear trend. 
 
Figure 8 – Volatility Plot: Utilities 
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Banks 
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Utilities 
Figure 7 shows a plot of the volatility for banks against time. 
 
Figure 8 displays a plot of the volatility for utilities against time. 
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The pattern for Utilities show increased volatility during the three crises. However, overall, the 
volatility is low (note the scaling on the y-axis) and fairly even over time. The graph may 
suggest a weak upward trend, but not very obvious.  
 
Figure 9 – Volatility Plot: Chemicals 
 
 
 
Chemicals do not seem to have responded to the banking crisis in the early 1990’s, but we see 
increased volatility during the dotcom bubble. Also, we note that the volatility seems to have 
reached higher levels just before the subprime crisis, and that the (relatively) high levels of 
volatility have persisted ever since.  
 
Figure 10 – Volatility Plot: Technology 
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Chemicals 
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Technology 
Figure 9 presents a plot of the volatility for chemicals against time. 
 
Figure 10 shows a plot of the volatility for technology against time. 
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Finally, we look at the graph for Technology. Not surprisingly, a distinct spike appears during 
the dotcom bubble. We see small bumps during the other two main crises as well, but they 
appear almost insignificant in comparison. Once again, the graph does not suggest the presence 
of a trend in the time series. Plots over all industry-specific time series are presented in 
Appendix III. 
 
5.2.3. Tests for Unit Roots and Trends 
Just as in the case with MKT, IND and FIRM, we are interested to see if the     
  series 
contain unit roots and trends. The trend tests can be seen as a control for our main results in 
Section 5. If we find general trends in the volatility of individual industries that point in a 
certain direction, we may have to re-evaluate our previous findings. Also, in order to perform 
the trend tests (using regression analysis), we have to be confident that the variables are 
stationary. We run Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, including a constant and a trend, on all 
series. Again, the lag length is set by AIC.  
 
The results show us that we accept the null hypothesis of a unit root for Automobiles & Parts. 
Testing again in first difference, we reject the null at the 1% level, and conclude that the 
variable is I(1). For Food & Beverage and Chemicals we reject the null at the 10% level and for 
Real Estate we reject the null at the 5% level. For all other industries we reject the null at the 
1% level. As for the presence of trends in our series, we perform the same trend test as before 
(see equation (11) in Section 5.2.), but with each industry as dependent (and lagged dependent) 
variable. Automobiles & Parts are regressed in first difference since we cannot confidently 
reject that the series contains a unit root. The tests are performed over the full sample period, 
and the results are presented in Table 11 (see Appendix IV). 
 
Looking at the table, we note that only the trend coefficients for a handful industries (that is: 
Chemicals, Food & Beverage, Health Care, Personal & Household Goods, 
Telecommunications and Utilities) are statistically significant. The industries in which we find 
a trend exhibit very different characteristics, but a common factor in our sample is the relatively 
low beta value with regard to the entire market, where all betas for the industries with 
significant coefficients are 0.78 or below. We can also point out that of the significant 
coefficients; four out of six are negative, which may imply that those industries have become 
less volatile over time.  
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6. Analysis and Discussion 
In this section, we will discuss some of our results and possible explanations further.  
 
We find that our MKT, IND and FIRM measures are autocorrelated, but reject the hypothesis 
that they contain unit roots. Furthermore, we find a fairly high correlation between MKT and 
FIRM, and that FIRM tends to Granger-cause MKT (as well as IND). We also note that FIRM 
constitutes the largest part of the total market volatility. 
  
We find no signs or evidence suggesting that our FIRM component follows an increasing linear 
trend. The same holds for MKT and IND. The trend coefficients are consistently non-
significant, except for the time period between 1993:1 and 2002:4, in which we believe that the 
bull market in the 1990’s and the dotcom bubble explains most of the upward volatility trend. 
This result diverges somewhat from the findings of Campbell et al. (2001), Xu and Malkiel 
(2001), Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) and Wei and Zhang (2006) among others. Wei and 
Zhang (2006) argue that an increase in the amount of newly listed stocks can, since they tend to 
be more volatile than stocks issued by older companies with larger market capitalization, 
increase the average idiosyncratic volatility on the market. We have not performed any tests on 
this issue, but one can interpret this in two ways; long-term and short-term increases in 
volatility due to increasing numbers of newly listed stocks. The long-term perspective clearly 
does not hold for the Swedish market. We see the number of firms increase from 135 in 1985 to 
461 in 2012 (341%), but no upward trend in idiosyncratic volatility. However, we note that the 
number of firms in the sample seems to increase just before a crisis emerges, which may 
suggest that the rate of new listings may have predictive power on economic distress (and thus 
also increases in idiosyncratic risk because of the observed co-movement with total market 
volatility).  
 
A possible explanation for our results may be the same as Brandt et al. (2009) suggests, namely 
that the upward (or downward) tendencies in volatility levels that some authors find (mostly for 
data previous to year 2000), is just an episodic phenomenon and a part of the cyclical behaviour 
of the economy. We clearly see periods in our sample where the volatility level of all measures 
increases, but they soon revert back to their long-term mean.  
Guo and Savickas (2008), conclude that the average idiosyncratic volatility is highly correlated 
across the G7 countries, and that the volatility of the U.S. market tends to Granger-cause the 
volatility in the other G7 countries (and vice versa). The high correlation of idiosyncratic 
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volatility across countries is also found by Bekaert et al. (2009). Because of the relatively 
developed character of the Swedish stock market, we have reasonably good reasons to believe 
that the correlation holds for Sweden as well. Some more recent articles (see for instance 
Brandt et al. (2009) and Zhang (2010)) on the subject conclude that the upward trend in 
idiosyncratic volatility on the U.S. market has diminished or stagnated during the last decade, 
and if the correlation holds, we should find similar patterns in Sweden. This would support our 
findings.  
 
When it comes to individual industries, we see that only a handful of our     
  measures 
exhibit a statistically significant trend over the full sample period. In fact, four out of six 
significant trend coefficients are negative, which may imply that those industries have become 
less volatile over time. We also note that the industries with a significant trend have very low 
beta values, which in general is characteristic for relatively stable industries. Furthermore, we 
see that Media has the highest volatility peak of all industries during the subprime crisis in the 
late 2008/early 2009. This is a fairly surprising result, since one might expect a more volatile 
industry, alternatively, an industry that is directly connected to the financial markets, to be 
affected more than Media during a financial crisis of the magnitude as the one we just 
experienced. Lastly, we note out that the volatility of 13 out of 19 industries does not follow a 
linear trend, which is in line with the main results from the analysis of the MKT, IND and 
FIRM component. 
 
We conclude that the level of idiosyncratic volatility has been stable over the sample. That is, 
on average, the problems briefly introduced in Section 2.2. regarding high and increasing levels 
of idiosyncratic volatility, should in general not apply to the Swedish market. The exception, of 
course, is during times of economic distress when the idiosyncratic volatility temporarily 
increases considerably. During these periods, mispricing of stocks and options, as well as 
under-diversification, may lead to unintended and unwanted levels of risk exposure. Also, the 
number of stocks needed in a portfolio in order to diversify away the increased idiosyncratic 
(unsystematic) risk during these periods may be significantly higher than the usual rule-of-
thumb of 20 to 30 stocks. This implies that in very volatile periods, not only the systematic risk 
increases, but it is also more difficult to eliminate the idiosyncratic risk from one’s portfolio.  
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7. Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 
We reach the conclusion, after performing a study in the same manner as Campbell et al. 
(2001), that the average idiosyncratic volatility of the Swedish stock market between 1985 and 
2012 does not follow a long-term linear (upward) trend. Nor does the average volatility at 
market-, or industry level. We have found evidence suggesting that there are periods in which 
the levels of volatility drastically increases for all measures, but this appears to be only a 
temporary effect, mostly caused by general economic distress and/or economic 
“bubbles”/extreme bull markets such as the dotcom bubble in the early 2000’s. Moreover, we 
find that average firm-level volatility constitutes the largest part of the total volatility on the 
Swedish stock market, which is entirely in line with the findings of Campbell et al. (2001). Our 
results also suggest that average market-level volatility is significantly and negatively related to 
GDP growth. 
 
As for our measure of volatility for individual industries, we conclude that some industries 
have had extreme volatility peaks in different periods depending on the characteristics of each 
industry (for instance Banks during the banking crisis in the early 1990’s), and, rather 
surprisingly, that Media had the highest volatility level of all industries during the subprime 
crisis. Furthermore, we find that six industries exhibit a linear trend in the full sample period, 
out of which four are negative (suggesting a decrease in volatility, as opposed to an increase). 
We also note that every industry with a significant trend coefficient has a low beta value with 
respect to the total market.  
 
However, since the scope (or purpose) of this thesis does not allow for testing the actual cause 
for volatility fluctuations (or lack of fluctuations), we cannot draw any in-depth conclusions 
regarding explanations for the observed patterns. A few possible explanations have been 
touched upon, but we leave this for future research on the Swedish market. Additionally, 
although we have provided evidence and a statistical overview of the volatility patterns for 
individual industries, a more rigorous study on the topic would be of great interest for investors 
that, for some reason, may be restricted to the Swedish market. For instance, our study raises 
questions about the trending industries. Are the trends persistent? Are the low beta values just a 
coincidence? 
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Appendix 
Appendix I 
Below follows a detailed derivation of the volatility decomposition as proposed by Campbell et 
al. (2001): 
 
Industries are denoted with the subscript j, and individual firms with the subscript i. As 
opposed to Campbell et al. (2001), we chose to use simple returns instead of excess returns. 
The return of firm j in industry i in period t is denoted     , and the weight of firm j in industry 
i in period t is denoted     .  
 
The return of industry i in period t is defined as     ∑            . Moreover, the weight of 
industry i in the total market is denoted by      ∑        , and the return of the total market is 
denoted as     ∑        . 
 
We start by writing down a decomposition based on the CAPM with zero-intercept. For 
industry returns, we have: 
 
(13)                              ̃  
 
and for individual firms: 
 
(14)                         ̃   ̃    
 
In (13),     is the beta for industry i with respect to the market return, and   ̃  is an industry-
specific residual. In (14),     is the beta of firm j with respect to the market,     is the beta of 
firm j in industry i with respect to the industry fluctuations and  ̃    is a firm-specific residual.  
If we take the weighted sums of the different beta-values, we have: 
 
(15)  ∑            ∑               ∑              
 
Using (13) and (14), we can assure ourselves that the different components of firm returns are 
orthogonal, which allows for a decomposition in which all covariance terms are equal to zero: 
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(16)               
                ̃   
 
(17)               (    )     
             
       ̃        ̃     
 
In order to decompose the different volatility measures without estimating betas, we use a 
simplified industry return decomposition in which we omit the industry beta-coefficient: 
 
(18)                               
 
Here,     is simply the difference between the industry return (   ) and the market return (   ). 
This is referred to as a “market-adjusted-return-model”. If we compare (13) and (18), we have: 
 
(19)                 ̃             
 
Here,     and     are not orthogonal, implying that covariances cannot be ignored. The 
variance of the industry return is: 
 
(20)                                                   
                                                                                   
 
However, since the weighted average of variances across industries is free of individual 
covariances, we have: 
 
(21)         ∑                       ∑                 
     
  
 
Where    
           and    
  ∑             . Since ∑           we can use the 
residual from (14),    , to measure the average industry-level volatility without estimating any 
betas. ∑              can be interpreted as the expected volatility of a randomly drawn 
industry.  
 
The procedure is similar for individual firms. We omit the beta from (14): 
 
(22)                            
 
35 
 
Where     is the same as in (19) and      is the difference between the firm return and the sum 
of the market- and industry return: 
 
(23)                         ̃    (     )             ̃  
 
Similar to the industry case, the variance of the firm return is: 
 
(24)           (    )                       (    ) 
                   (        )                 
 
The covariances can be expressed in terms of betas and variances: 
 
(25)            (        )        ̃              ̃    (     )    (     )  ̃   
                   (     )      ̃          (     )         
 
(26)                              (     )          
 
Hence, we have that the weighted average of firm variances in industry i is: 
 
(27)           ∑                                        
                   
 
Where     
  ∑                  is the weighted average of firm-level volatility in industry i. 
 
If we now compute the weighted average across industries, we obtain a variance decomposition 
that does not require any estimation of betas (since the industry betas sum to one): 
 
(28)  ∑     ∑           (    )           ∑              ∑         
  
        
     
     
  
 
Where    
  ∑         
  ∑     ∑           (    ) is the weighted average of firm-level 
volatility across all firms. 
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Appendix II 
 
Table 10 – Cyclical Properties: Stock Market Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Cyclical Properties: Stock Market Returns 
Dependent Variable: Quarterly OMXS Returns 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant 0.0429*** 
(0.0141) 
0.0430*** 
(0.0143) 
0.0334* 
(0.0171) 
0.0442*** 
(0.0141) 
0.0327* 
(0.0176) 
0.0445*** 
(0.0137) 
0.0329* 
(0.0170) 
0.0201 
(0.0138) 
OMXSt-1 
0.3060*** 
(0.1133) 
0.3092*** 
(0.1079) 
0.2727*** 
(0.0999) 
0.3068*** 
(0.1129) 
0.2949*** 
(0.0995) 
0.3002*** 
(0.1004) 
0.2721*** 
(0.1003) 
0.3299*** 
(0.0950) 
GDPt-1 
-0.4467 
(0.2821) 
-0.4477 
(0.2862) 
-0.3751 
(0.2910) 
-0.4478 
(0.2848) 
-0.3730 
(0.2922) 
-0.4460 
(0.2905) 
-0.3739 
(0.2914) 
-0.3420 
(0.2712) 
MKTt-1 
-0.1084 
(0.8999) 
- -0.8189 
(0.6767) 
0.1321 
(0.9633) 
- - -0.9023 
(0.4661) 
- 
INDt-1 
-2.1062 
(1.4155) 
-2.1436 
(1.1831) 
- -2.0246 
(1.3885) 
- -1.9065*** 
(0.6769) 
- - 
FIRMt-1 
0.1973 
(0.2655) 
0.1577 
(0.4359) 
-0.0583 
(0.2786) 
- -0.4356* 
(0.2374) 
- - - 
Adj. R
2 
0.1234 0.1360 0.0963 0.1349 0.1024 0.1470 0.1091 0.0976 
Table 10 presents the results from the regressions with quarterly OMXS returns as dependent variable. The left column 
presents the regressors, of which all is lagged by one time period except for the constant. The numbers represent the value of 
the coefficients in each regression, and the significance level is denoted with one, two or three asterisks, representing 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (-) indicate that the variable is omitted from the model. The bottom 
row displays the adjusted R
2
 value. All regressions are performed using Newey-West robust standard errors. 
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3
-1
2
-0
1
2
0
0
6
-0
4
-0
1
2
0
0
8
-0
8
-0
1
2
0
1
0
-1
2
-0
1
Retail 
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
0,14
0,16
0,18
0,2
1
9
8
5
-0
4
-0
1
1
9
8
7
-0
8
-0
1
1
9
8
9
-1
2
-0
1
1
9
9
2
-0
4
-0
1
1
9
9
4
-0
8
-0
1
1
9
9
6
-1
2
-0
1
1
9
9
9
-0
4
-0
1
2
0
0
1
-0
8
-0
1
2
0
0
3
-1
2
-0
1
2
0
0
6
-0
4
-0
1
2
0
0
8
-0
8
-0
1
2
0
1
0
-1
2
-0
1
Telecommunications 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
1
9
8
5
-0
4
-0
1
1
9
8
7
-0
8
-0
1
1
9
8
9
-1
2
-0
1
1
9
9
2
-0
4
-0
1
1
9
9
4
-0
8
-0
1
1
9
9
6
-1
2
-0
1
1
9
9
9
-0
4
-0
1
2
0
0
1
-0
8
-0
1
2
0
0
3
-1
2
-0
1
2
0
0
6
-0
4
-0
1
2
0
0
8
-0
8
-0
1
2
0
1
0
-1
2
-0
1
Travel & Leisure 
0
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,05
0,06
0,07
0,08
0,09
0,1
1
9
8
5
-0
4
-0
1
1
9
8
7
-0
8
-0
1
1
9
8
9
-1
2
-0
1
1
9
9
2
-0
4
-0
1
1
9
9
4
-0
8
-0
1
1
9
9
6
-1
2
-0
1
1
9
9
9
-0
4
-0
1
2
0
0
1
-0
8
-0
1
2
0
0
3
-1
2
-0
1
2
0
0
6
-0
4
-0
1
2
0
0
8
-0
8
-0
1
2
0
1
0
-1
2
-0
1
Utilities 
40 
 
Appendix IV 
 
 
 
 
Trend Test - Individual Industries 
Industry Trend coefficient*104
 
Automobiles & Parts
1 -0.236 
Banks -3.17 
Basic Resources -1.49 
Chemicals 3.39*** 
Construction & Materials -0.754 
Financial Services -0.651 
Food & Beverage -3.2** 
Health Care -1.56** 
Industrial Goods & Services 0.253 
Insurance 0.226 
Media 1.09 
Oil & Gas -2.88 
Personal & Household Goods -1.27* 
Real Estate -1.61 
Retail -0.846 
Technology 0.142 
Telecommunications -3.96** 
Travel & Leisure -2.33 
Utilities 1.44** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 presents the results from the trend tests performed on the volatility measure for each 
individual industry. Numbers represent the value of the trend coefficient multiplied by 10
4
. 
The regression is specified as     
                  
    , where     
  is the industry-
specific volatility measure at time t,    is a constant,   is the trend and       
  is the industry-specific 
volatility measure, lagged by one time period. 
1
 Automobiles & parts is tested in first differences, since we cannot reject the presence of a unit root. 
Table 11 – Trend Tests: Individual Industries 
